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MINERAL AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
STRUCTURES AND SUBSTANCE
By David N. Smith * and Louis T. Wells, Jr.**
PROLOGUE
Despite the many dramatic developments that have occurred over the
past half dozen years in relation to the production of natural resources in
some areas of the third world, mineral production in most developing
countries is still carried out through contractual arrangements between
foreign firms and host country governments. The nationalization of the
copper industry in Chile and the baudte industry in Guyana, the spectac-
ular successes of OPEC, and the completed or projected nationalizations
of petroleum operations in a number of countries have taken center stage
since 1969. Nevertheless, these developments are not typical of the vast
majority of mineral arrangements in developing countries.
Most mineral contracts negotiated in recent years do, however, differ sig-
nificantly from those of a decade or so earlier. In fact, many of those earlier
agreements have been revised to reflect the standards of the more recent
agreements. The hands of the developing countries have been strength-
ened in some instances through improved access to information from other
producing countries as well as through the assistance of international organ-
izations.
Changes in the structures of various industries as well as increased host
country awareness of issues relating to sovereignty have affected various
relationships. But improvements have been uneven. Contractual arrange-
ments between developing countries and foreign companies reflect this fact.
The way in which an individual agreement is shaped is influenced by rela-
tive bargaining strength (which itself is shaped by several factors, includ-
ing the structure of the particular industry and the firm's role in that
industry); the host country's concern with issues of sovereignty and con-
trol; and the information and negotiating skills which each party brings
to the bargaining table. These factors influence both the form and the
substance of the agreements.
Recent changes have generated a number of innovations in the structure
of agreements. The principal purpose of this article is to explore some of
these innovations and to suggest their relationship to the various substan-
tive goals of the parties.
Analyses of the forms and substance of concession agreements, partic-
ularly outside the oil industry, have been rare. This fact is, no doubt,
largely a result of the difficulty that any potential analyst has faced in
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gaining access to contracts. A number of scholars who wrote about con-
cession-related problems in the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's felt obliged to
issue apologies for never having seen more than a handful of, usually
dated, concession agreements." Even now, significant collections of agree-
ments are generally found only in the files of individuals who have served
as consultants to developing countries.
INTRODUCTION
Arrangements between foreign investors and host countries for the de-
velopment of natural resources have carried many names: "concession
agreement," "economic development agreement," "service contract," "work
contract," "joint venture contract," "production-sharing agreement," and,
most recently, "participation agreement." Occasionally, within particular
countries, the distinctions in terminology are significant in differentiating
various forms of arrangements.' In other instances, varying terminologies
relate to agreements of essentially the same nature.3 In still other cases,
the same terminology has been utilized in one country for agreements
which are, in substance, quite different from each other.4
In many cases, the choices of terminology and form reflect political con-
siderations. A developing country may find more acceptable over the long
run an agreement characterized as a "work contract" which provides, as
the Indonesian Kennecott Copper work contract did, that
All mineral resources contained in the territories of the Republic of
Indonesia . .. are the national wealth of the Indonesian nation (and
1 See, for example, Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, 105 REC. DES COoRs
272, 283 (I, 1962) ("... practical difficulties of assembling primary source material.");
Brudno, Review of Considerations Arising in Foreign Oil Operations, Nrmr ANN.
INsrIruTE oN O .AND GAS LAw AND TAxATrON 397 (1958) ("Information as to the
details of existing concessions is sparse, and that as to the actual tax results of operat-
ing under these concessions is elusive."); Guldberg, International Concessions, A
Problem of International Economic Law, 15 NoRDisE TrDssamr FoR INTERNATIONAL
RT 47, 50 (1944) (". . . [Miost of the concession agreements which are reproduced
here are of older concessions. This is due to the fact that concession agreements are
nearly never published. They are jealously hidden.... ." )
2 In Indonesia the "work contracts" for the development of hard minerals are quite
different from the "production-sharing contracts" for the development of oil. Compare,
e.g., Contract of Work between the Republic of Indonesia and P. T. Kennecott Indo-
nesia (Nov. 1, 1969) (for the development of copper) and Production-Sharing Con-
tract between P.N. Pertamina and Phillips Petroleum Company (1968). Unless other-
wise indicated, specific contracts are in the personal files of the authors.
3 Many so-called "work contracts" are essentially the same as the traditional con-
cession. The main distinction appears, in many cases, to be simply the minor issue
of the point at which title to the mineral is vested in the foreign company.
4 In the early 1960's in Indonesia a number of "work contracts" for the exploration
and exploitation of oil were negotiated. They were essentially profit-sharing arrange-
rnents. See, e.g., Contract of Work between P.N. Pertambangan Minjak Nasional and
P.T. Stanvac Indonesia (1963). Reproduced in 3 ILM 243 (1964). The recent hard
mineral "work contracts" provide for the imposition of a normal corporate income
tax. See Contract of Work betwveen Indonesia and P.T. Kennecott Indonesia, note 2
.upra.
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that) Kennecott shall be, and hereby is appointed, the sole contractor
for the Government with respect to the Contract Area,5
than it would an agreement characterized as a "concession agreement"
which provides, as the Liberian Gewerkschaft Exploration Concession
Agreement 6 did, that
The Government . . . grants to the Concessionaire . . . the exclusive
right and privilege to . . . exploit deposits of all kinds of ores. . ..
Aside from the possible implications for calculating compensation in the
case of nationalization,8 the difference between the Liberian agreement and
the Indonesian contract is largely one of terminology and of the point at
which title to the resource passes to the investor. But choice of terminol-
ogy may be crucial to a country's sense of sovereignty and control.
Contract provisions may differ substantially in terms of economic sig-
nificance. The economic implications of agreements can be compared by
projecting cash flows under alternative assumptions about the future and
discounting these flows to a present value. Yet, the political and psycho-
logical issues are, in most cases, of overriding importance in the selection
of a particular form of agreement.
Although the terminology is often confusing and inconsistent, it is possi-
ble to discern regularities in the various forms of arrangements which ac-
cord with a host country's bargaining power and negotiating skills, differ-
ences in the structures of various industries, and the interests of the
particular company. Within certain countries and within certain indus-
tries, one can observe the influence of changes in relative bargaining
powers. The pattern is frequently a shift from traditional concession
agreements in which the terms were primarily financial to forms in which
the government reserves to itself substantial participation in and control
over the venture.
An examination of the major types of agreements provides a framework
for understanding some of the complex technical and strategic problems
faced by both parties as well as some of the approaches commonly em-
5 Id., Preamble; see also Art. 1 (a).
a Concession Agreement between the Republic of Liberia and the Gewerkschaft Ex-
ploration Company, Dusseldorf, West Germany (1958) in Chapter 33 of the Acts
Approved by the Legislature of the Government of the Republic of Liberia during the
1958--59 Session.
71d. Art. 1.
8 These implications may, of course, be very important. On this issue, see 2 Thn
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 78 and 111-12
(R. Lillich ed. 1973).
9This has been done by us for host governments and by others in unpublished ma-
terials. See E. G. Warner, Mixed International Joint Ventures in the Exploration, De-
velopment, and Production of Petroleum, June 1972 (unpublished M.S. thesis, Sloan
School of M.I.T.); W. T. Levy Consultants Corp., N.Y., A Corn TrAvE EvALUATION
OF MAJOR CoNCEssIONARY AImAuNGEM=Ts Now iN EFFECT, cited in Warner at 40, 60.
See also T. R. Stauffer, Economics of Petroleum Taxation in the Eastern Hemisphere, a
paper delivered at an OPEC seminar on International Oil and Energy Policies of the
Producing and Consuming Countries (Vienna, June 30-July 5, 1969).
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ployed to achieve accommodation to the political and financial needs of
the parties. For analytical convenience, we have classified agreements
under the following three rubrics: the Traditional Concession; the Modem
Concession; and Production-Sharing, Service, and Work Contracts.
MnING CODES AND AD Hoc AGREa~mENTs
The terms governing the relationships between a foreign investor in
mineral development and the government of a developing country are
usually set forth in ad hoe arrangements. Although mineral producing
countries usually have general mining codes, foreign investment laws, and
general income tax codes, these laws often allow government officials con-
siderable latitude in shaping individual concession arrangements to fit the
particular circumstances.
Many mining codes establish a general framework within which mineral
contracts are negotiated. The 1971 Peruvian General Mining Law, for
example, dealt with such basic problems as affirmation of state ownership
of minerals, the granting of prospecting and exploration permits, the role
of the state in mining operations, tax rates, the roles of various government
agencies in granting and supervising concessions, and welfare and security
of mine workers. The law also set forth detailed provisions relating to
such subjects as causes for lapsing or revocation of a concession and fines
to be imposed for certain transgressions.'0 These are matters which are
set forth at length in some individual agreements, but which, aside from tax
rates, seldom need special treatment. Their inclusion in a general mining
code reduces the scope for bargaining, and standardization may make them
easier for the host government to enforce. Moreover, their presence in the
general laws tends to keep them from surfacing as terms to be modified if
negotiations are reopened.
In petroleum, where governments have had considerable experience to
draw upon and where many of the terms have become standard, less flex-
ibility is evident in the negotiation of specific contracts than is typical of
hard minerals. The Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955, for example, included
a standard form of concession which was to be used for all oil concession-
aires in the country. However, even for petroleum there are exceptions.
The Indonesian Petroleum Law of 1960 (which governed oil contracts into
10 Peru, General Mining Law: Decree Law No. 18880 (Lima: Ministry of Economics
and Finance, Office of Public Relations, 1971). A number of countries legislated new
mining codes in the first half of the 1970's. See, for example, Ecuador, Mining De-
velopment Law (Supreme Decree 101 of January 24, 1974), U.S. DEPT. OF IrEiuon,
BuREAu oF Mums, 71 MnwaExL TRADE NoTEs, April 1974, at 7; Saudi Arabia, Mining
Code 70 id., June 1973, at 20; Sudan Mines and Quarries Act, 1972, id., May 1973,
at 15.
For general information on mining legislation, see UN ECAFE, Proceedings of the
Seminar on Mining Legislation and Administration (Mineral Resource Development Ser.
No. 34), UN Doe. E/CN.11/919 (1969) and UN ECAFE, Proceedings of the Seminar
on Petroleum Legislation with Particular Reference to Offshore Operations (Mineral
Resourco Development Ser., No. 40), UN Doe. E/CN.11/1052 (1969).
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the 1970's) nowhere specified the contents of petroleum contracts. Indeed,
the production-sharing contract-the form of agreement used in Indonesia
-was not mentioned in the 1960 law.
In general, ad hoc agreements for the exploitation of minerals in develop-
ing countries cover a wide range of issues, usually including such matters
as taxation, import and export regulation, employment policy and condi-
tions, management structure, exchange control, company and state rights
and obligations, and infrastructure. Many concession agreements are an
expression of virtually all the laws that will govern the company's opera-
tions in the country.
In the advanced countries one rarely finds comprehensive agreements of
the type found in the developing nations. In the industrialized countries,
the mining firms are usually subject to the general laws of the land; only
a few narrow issues may be handled on a company-by-company basis."
But there are a number of reasons why most developing countries rely
heavily on ad hoe arrangements: the special nature of the multinational
company; the major role that the foreign extractive company typically
plays in the general economic development of the country; and the legal
tradition of the nation.
The multinational enterprise brings a bundle of problems that are usually
inadequately covered by the legal system of the developing country. For
example, company pricing among affiliated entities in different countries
creates difficulties for tax and exchange control authorities. The income
tax laws and exchange regulations in many developing countries were de-
signed solely to govern locally owned business operations; they simply do
not contain the principles and regulations required'to handle transactions
among affiliated companies. Most host countries have not had the need or
the resources to draft general comprehensive mining, income tax, and com-
pany laws appropriate for regulating the multinational enterprise. Ad hoc
arrangements provide a way of handling the problems.
The importance of mining activities in many developing countries pro-
vides an additional incentive for ad hoc arrangements. The operation of
the foreign extractive enterprise frequently occupies a major role in na-
tional budgetary planning. In Zambia, for example, 46 percent of gross
domestic product in 1969 was attributable to a few large mining firms.
In Liberia, the income from four concession operations accounted for al-
most 65 percent of income tax revenue for 1968. In such a situation, gen-
eral legislative approaches to govern the terms of mineral firms are not
particularly attractive to government officials when a few agreements can
be tailored directly to the circumstances.
In addition, the legal traditions of many host countries do not favor
comprehensive codes. Rather, the tradition may be one of reliance on reg-
ulations and administrative decrees within a system in which general laws
provide only broad guidelines. In some instances, the ad hoc concession
11 For details, see OECD, THE ExPLOAnoN FOR AN EXpLOrrATION or CnuDrm Om.
m NATraAL GAS IN THE OECD AREA INCLUDING THE CONTMNENTAL SHELF; MINING
AND FISCAL LEGISLATION (1973).
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agreement plays the role of a specific administrative regulation which elab-
orates a general law's policy directives.
It is not only the host government that may favor ad hoc agreements.
Many foreign investors themselves seek such agreements to decrease the
uncertainty of the investment. Unsure whether the political process in the
host country is such that the general laws wvill develop in reasonable ways,
investors turn to agreements the terms of which will be fixed over a long
time period. The result is that investors seek greater guarantees of stabil-
ity in developing countries than they would dare hope for in similar proj-
ects in advanced countries. In the late 1960's, for example, Australian and
British investors negotiated an ad hoc arrangement in the Australian terri-
tory of Papua New Guinea (for the Bougainville copper project) even
though the general laws in Papua New Guinea were similar to those of
Australia, in which they already had operations. Although the Bougain-
ville agreement did provide certain important tax advantages not available
under the general laws, one of its principal features was to freeze the
general tax provisions in their status at the time the agreement was
reached. As a result, a few years later the company was operating under
a more favorable tax regime in Papua New Guinea than it faced in Aus-
tralia. Both governments had changed their taxation of mining operations.
In Australia, the company was subject to the changes. In Papua New
Guinea, the ad hoc agreement froze the tax levies applicable to the project.
A few developing countries have tried to avoid ad hoc contracts, but
their success has been limited. Faced with a major investment, they
usually revert to individual negotiations. The economic and political con-
sequences are too important to be left to general laws that may not cover
the situation adequately. Malaysia, for example, has long relied on gen-
eral legislation to govern most of the conditions for small tin investments.
When the prospects of a large copper development appeared in 1970, how-
ever, the government made sure that special negotiations were conducted,
and that the federal government, not the state government (as in the case
of tin), represented the nation.
Although successful efforts to abandon entirely arrangements that are
tailored to a particular enterprise have been limited, in most countries the
investor has been subject to general laws which govern a progressively
wider area of activities. The host government may specify in its general
legislation the tax regime, labor laws, and other terms to govern investment
in a particular sector. This trend may be reinforced as foreign investors
increasingly recognize that ad hoe arrangements do not provide the long
term guarantee that they purport to give. The general legislation may,
in practice, give more certainty than ad hoc contracts that purport to be
binding for 15 or more years, but which in reality are changed as bargain-
ing powers shift. In fact, by 1975 in a few countries the only area of
significant bargaining concerned equity participation. With most of the
terms fixed by law, including tax provisions, participation in ownership
becomes the principal vehicle for the parties to strike a bargain that re-
flects their relative bargaining powers.
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THE TRADrnONAL CONCESSION
The agreements between foreign companies and host governments in the
first half of the century were generally recorded in simple documents in
which the concessionaire was given almost unrestricted rights in exploiting
one or more natural resources. Typically, the concessionaire was granted
extensive rights over a very large land area, often much larger than an
investor could be expected to develop within a reasonable time period.12
The period of the contract was usually very long: in many, the terms were
to run for 50 or 60 years or more. 3
Royalties as the Initial Basis for Calculating Financial Obligations
The financial (and other) obligations imposed on investors in those early
days were generally limited. Contracts which were negotiated from the
turn of the century through the 1940's normally required the concession-
aires to make payments based on the number of physical units of output
or on the value of output from particular mines. Although these royalty
payments accounted for by far the greatest portion of government revenues
from the concession, a nominal land tax was also usually imposed on the
area under the concessionaire's control."
Many of the earliest concession agreements called for royalties based on
volume of output, rather than on value. Oil agreements illustrate the pat-
tern. From 1900 to 1950 most oil concessions relied on the payment of
royalties based on the tonnage of crude oil produced. A few attempts to
collect income taxes were made early in the history of oil concessions but
they were abortive. The 1920 agreement between the Persian Government
and the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. called for an income tax on the worldwide
income of the enterprise, excluding only profits arising from transportation
of the oil.15 The experiment was premature and short lived. The con-
tracting parties reverted to royalty arrangements. The Iraqi agreement
with the Khanaqin Oil Company in 1926 provides a more typical example
of an oil contract of that era. It called for payment of four gold shillings
12 In describing a 1906 concession grant by the Congo Comit6 Special du Katanga to
the Union Mini~re du Haut-Katanga, two commentators wrote that "the Company's
rights were so extensive as to partake of quasigovernmental powers akin to those ac-
corded the great trading companies of an earlier concession era." Wetter and Schwe-
bel, Some Little Known Cases on Concessions, 40 Bmrt. Y.B. or INT. LAW 193 (1964).
Fifty years ago the United Fruit Company owned or leased about 5,000 square miles
of tropical lands, using only about 10% productively at the time. Fox, United Fruit
and Latin America, 4 HARVARD BEv. 32, 33 (No. 4, 1968).
13 The lease given to the Firestone Company by the Liberian Government in 1926
was to run for 99 years and covered one million acres of land. See W. C. Taylor, Tum
FnxsroNE OPERA-TONS IN LrBnrn xi (Washington: National Planning Association,
1956).
14 See the various land taxes listed in Ghana, Report of The Commission of Enquiry
into Concessions 32-79 (Accra-Tema: Ministry of Information, 1961).
15 H. CATtAN, Tim EVOLurTION or OIL CONCESSIONS IN T=E MIDDLE EAST AND NonTu
AruUCA 8 (1967).
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per ton of net crude oil produced and saved.10 In another case, the 1949
agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and Getty Oil provided
for a royalty of U.S. $0.55 per barrel.'7
Iron ore, timber, and even plantation agreements in developing countries
followed patterns similar to that of oil. The original (1945) agreement
between the Government of Liberia and the Liberian Mining Company,
Ltd. (LMC) provided for a basic royalty of five cents per ton on all iron
ore shipped.' 8 Timber agreements, in the same pattern, normally called
for a "stumpage fee" based on certain units of output. 9 And the United
Fruit Company paid one cent per stem for bananas harvested in its fields.20
Many later agreements in such industries abandoned the fixed cash
royalties in favor of royalties based on a percentage of the export price of
the resource. 21 The LMC agreement in Liberia combined the fixed pay-
ment per unit of ore with a royalty that was based on the value of the ore.
It provided that if, in any year, the average price of pig iron were to be
more than one hundred and fifteen percent of the average price of pig iron
for the prior ten years, an additional royalty was to be paid by the pro-
ducing firm.2' Similarly, timber and plantation arrangements have become
more complex in many countries.23
Compared to income tax arrangements, profit-sharing contracts, and pro-
duction-sharing agreements of more recent vintage, these early concession
agreements have two distinct advantages for the host government. First,
the royalty payment is a particularly easy type of levy to administer. To
collect a tax based on units of output, the government need only have a
physical count of the volume of production or shipments made by the con-
cessionaire. Secondly, the royalty seems to guarantee a certain payment
to the government for the depleted resources irrespective of the company's
profits and the world market price for the resource. As long as there is
production or sales, the government should receive revenue. This feature
has its attractions to a government worried about the stability of its
revenues.
In spite of the advantages of royalty arrangements, it was a rare con-
cession agreement by the late 1960's that relied entirely on royalties as the
source of payment to the host government. There were indeed some
agreements, such as that governing Le Nickel in New Caledonia, which
le Id. at 33. 17 Id. at 34.
18 Concession Agreement between the Government of Liberia and Liberian Mining
Company, Ltd. (Aug. 27, 1945), Art. 9(a); Approved by an Act of the Legislature
January 22, 1946.
19 See, Ghana, Report ... ,supra note 14, at 32ff.
20M. ,Vr-iiNs, THE MATURING oF MULTINATIONAL ENIERPRISE 127 (1974).
"LThe Ghana Commission of Enquiry into Concessions concluded in 1961 that "all
mineral and timber royalties should [henceforth] be required by law to be computed
on a percentage of the sales price ...... Ghana, Report ... , supra note 14, at 10.
2 See note 18 supra.
3 For an example of a stumpage fee adjusted in accordance with the wholesale price
of standard newsprint, see the Agreement between the Province of Newfoundland and
Newfoundland Pulp and Chemical Co., Ltd. (July 5, 1960), See. 14.
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still depended on royalties in 1974. However, the major disadvantages of
royalties had led to a dramatic increase in the importance of other kinds
of levies.
Increasing Importance of Income Taxation
By the 1950's the concept of taxation of concession income had gained
general acceptance in the arrangements between oil companies and their
host governments. The levy on income was implemented either through a
direct income tax, frequently at a rate of 50 percent, or through a "sharing
of profits" arranged in a way that made it roughly equivalent to an income
tax.
24
The shift from royalty to income tax in oil is well illustrated by the
figures for Venezuela. The following table shows that the portion of gov-
ernment revenue accounted for by income tax increased dramatically, at
the expense of royalties, during the post World War II period.
PERCENTAGE OF VENEzUELAN GOV'T REVENUES FnOMs FOREIGN
PETROLEUMt FIRMs THAT CAmE FRoM VARIOUS LEVIES
Income Surface
Year Royalty Tax Tax Customs Other Total
1938-1940 58.9% 0.0% 15.7% 21.7% 3.7% 100%
1941-1945 60.0 7.5 13.4 16.2 2.0 100
1946-1950 54.9 30.7 3.5 7.7 3.2 100
1951-1955 54.5 34.3 2.1 4.4 4.7 100
1956-1960 52.8 40.7 1.1 2.4 2.9 100
1961-1965 50.0 46.7 0.5 0.6 2.3 100
Source: Georg K. Gabriel, The Gains to the Local Economy from the Foreign Owncd Primary
Export Industry: The Case of Oil in Venezuela 92 (unpublished D.B.A. thesis,
Harvard Business School, May 1967).
More slowly the same kind of evolution has occurred in other extractive
industries.
In oil, hard minerals, timber, and plantations, the shift from royalty to
income tax has taken place in two ways: first, existing agreements have
been amended, either to substitute income taxation for royalty payments
or to supplement royalties with levies on income; second, new agreements
negotiated in the 1950's and later have incorporated income tax or profit-
sharing principles as the primary source of government revenue.
The Liberian Mining Company Agreement (LMC), one of our previous
examples of a royalty-based agreement, illustrates the changes that have
taken place. That arrangement has moved from one relying on royalty to
one relying on income taxation as the source of government revenue. The
original agreement, providing for a fixed basic royalty and a supplementary
royalty based on price, was changed by a 1952 collateral agreement, in
which LMC agreed to the government's "participation in profits" after a
certain point.25 Participation was to begin when LMC had liquidated its
debts and had brought its "recovery of investment" to four million dollars,
or by 1957, whichever came first. For the first five years from that date,
24 See CA'rrAN, supra note 15, at 44.
Vol. 69
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the government was to receive 25 percent of profits. During the next ten
years, it was to receive 35 percent of profits. Thereafter, it was to receive
50 percent of profits.2G The income tax was to supplement the royalty pay-
ments which would continue. In 1965 the basic agreement was further
amended to provide that the 50 percent participation rate would take effect
as of January 1, 1965, and that participation was to be in lieu of royalty
payments.27
Although in most agreements income tax became the principal source
of revenue, royalties by no means disappeared. Even with an income
tax, royalties could serve the purpose of assuring the government of
a minimum payment for the extraction of the resources when low prices
led to little or no profits. For example, the structure of the Indonesian
Kennecott agreement in West Irian in the early 1970's guaranteed that the
government would receive a royalty of 3.6 percent on copper even if low
prices were to lead to low taxable profits. Across the border in Papua
New Guinea, the higher income tax rates of the Bougainville arrangement
promised the government more when profits were high, but the low royalty
rate could leave the government in an unfavorable position should profits
turn out to be low.
In governments with federal systems, royalties have sometimes been re-
tained as a payment to states or provinces, with the income tax going to
the federal government.28 In some cases, a royalty that is progressive with
the prices of the mineral has been designed to capture for the government
a substantial portion of the "windfall" profits when prices are high.
Malaya, and later Malaysia, for example, had complex royalties for tin that
were designed for this purpose. In 1973, a similar royalty was being
proposed in British Columbia to apply to all mining in that province of
Canada.
The imposition of income taxes has resulted in a significant increase in
the burden on the administrative capacity of host governments. To assess
income tax, governments must be able to verify the sales prices of the
resource and the calculation of deductions for expenses that are charged
against gross income.29 In many cases the transactions that led to the
income or expenses have been with entities affiliated with the foreign in-
vestor. In those cases, the firm might use prices that are not those of
arm's length transactions or it might utilize other techniques to shift profits
from one tax jurisdiction to another. The administrative machinery of
many host countries would simply have been unable to deal with these
problems in the first half of this century. Most governments were still
struggling to obtain adequate administrative capability in the mid-1970's.
26 See Collateral Agreement of March 12, 1952, approved by an Act of the Legisla-
ture March 10, 1953.
27 Amendatory and Tax Agreement dated as of January 1, 1965 between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Liberia and Liberian Mining Co., Ltd., Clause 1.
28 This is the case in Malaysia and Canada, for example.
29 An exception to this is the situation where, as has been the case in petroleum,
a posted price is used.
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The administrative problems that result from the shift to income taxes
have been recognized repeatedly. In a study undertaken in the mid-1950's,
for example, the difficulty in income tax administration was mentioned ex-
plicitly as a major reason for retaining the per-unit stumpage fee for timber
concessions in Ghana. 0 In the early 1970's, one government consultant
recommended royalties as the only tax for the proposed Asahan Smelter in
Sumatra, in recognition of the administrative problems Indonesia would
have with an income tax on an operation involving primarily transactions
among affiliated companies. In 1974 an official from Guyana claimed that
Reynolds had so set its transfer prices that it had never shown a profit on
bauxite mined in that country. The tax on income had produced no rev-
enue beyond a minimum sum that applied no matter what profits were
reported.31
With the difficulties involved in the administration of income tax ar-
rangements, it is little wonder that many governments have been dis-
appointed initially in their receipts from the tax. In one case, we calcu-
lated that inability (or unwillingness) to administer properly the complex
tax provisions of an agreement was costing the host government at least
35 percent of what seemed to be due under the terms of the arrangement.
The shift away from royalties to some form of income taxation has, how-
ever, been based on a realistic perception of the level of payments that the
host government can collect under the two types of levy. One problem
concerns the "floor" on payments that the royalty is supposed to provide.
Although the per-unit royalty purports to guarantee the government a min-
imum level of income on its resources, in practice royalties have from time
to time not been collected from companies that were not profitable. This
has been the case for Zambian copper and for Malaysian tin, for example.
Another difficulty has been in the level of revenue that could be collected.
In practice, royalties have seldom represented a significant portion of actual
company profits. Clearly, firms have been reluctant to take on heavy
royalties. From the company's point of view, a commitment to a large
royalty, particularly in the early years of an extractive operation, is poten-
tially dangerous. At the outset, the firm faces a great deal of uncertainty
whether it will be able to extract the natural resource profitably. The cost
of the royalty represents to the firm an additional cost of extraction, one
that will be incurred whether the project is profitable or not. On the other
hand, a commitment to pay an income tax on profits if they do materialize
appears less risky. If there are no profits, the company has no obligation
to pay tax to the host government. Under a pure income tax arrangement,
the firm incurs significant obligations only if profits are high. With a de-
sire to avoid risk, the foreign firms have usually been willing to agree to
an income tax that, if the expected level of profits results, would be larger
than any payments that would be agreeable under a royalty arrangement.
Although royalties had generally declined in importance by the early
1970's, the pace of decline was uneven. Indeed, it was not certain that the
3o Ghana, Report . . . , supra note 14, at 10.31 Private interview.
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days of royalty were numbered. In the case of oil, tax arrangements had
reverted to something similar to royalty arrangements. The posted price
had become the basis of calculation of profits in most agreements and this
price itself had become a subject of negotiation. In those countries where
the expenses that could be deducted in calculating income tax were limited
to a percentage of the value of the output, the income tax became, essen-
tially, a large royalty if expenses exceeded the stated limit. This effective
royalty appeared to be short lived. Late in 1973, the move was again in
the other direction as oil-producing countries began to tie the posted price
to the market price plus an increment. By 1975, changes were placing the
oil companies more in the position of service contractors than in the role
of tax or royalty payers.
In an oligopolistic industry such as oil, large royalties could be tolerable
for the companies. Periodic falls in price were hardly the threat that they
represented in, say, copper. Thus, profit levels seemed to be more pre-
dictable for the producing companies. Moreover, the form which the ef-
fective royalty took enabled it to qualify as an income tax for tax credits
in the home countries of the oil firms. Where profits are predictable and
where the royalty generates tax credits, the ease of administration provided
by royalty arrangements can make them an attractive form of levy.
Other Changes
The general shift from royalties to income taxation as the primary source
of government revenue was probably the most significant change in the
early development of concession agreements. But there were many other
changes. The later agreements usually included a number of terms that
were designed to bring benefits other than revenue to the host country.
Generally, the host government considered it important to introduce
into the agreements, or into the general laws of the country, provisions
that were designed to promote "linkages" between the extractive opera-
tion and the rest of the economy. As host countries perceived the possi-
bilities of using the foreign firm more fully to promote local development,
they sought ways to influence the actions of the firm.
Requirements that the project purchase goods of local manufacture and
requirements that the company hire and train local citizens were incor-
porated in a large number of arrangements. A number of agreements also
required the foreign company to guarantee access for local users to such
infrastructure as roads, railroads, and communications systems. Provisions
were made for the concessionaire to build and operate schools, hospitals,
and other services for the company's local workers. The foreign firm was
sometimes encouraged or required to contribute funds and talent to local
community development or to educational, agricultural, or technical in-
stitutions.
At the same time, rudiments of general labor and mining codes ap-
peared, either in the agreements or in the general laws of the host country.
Ad hoc agreements or the mining laws would specify such matters as the
minimum grades of ore that must be mined and the quality of timber that
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must be harvested. Safety and pollution standards were introduced, though
frequently in vague language and with little provision for enforcement.
In addition, the terms of agreements typically gave some attention to
the rights of third parties. These included, for example, the rights of local
residents to payment for land that was taken for the concession and to
access to traditional timber sources, agricultural land, water sources, and
sacred sites.
The Advantages of the Traditional Concession
With modifications in taxation and linkage provisions, the traditional
form of concession agreement has survived into the 1970's in many coun-
tries and for many industries. The original Bougainville agreement and
some of the concessions for hard minerals negotiated in Indonesia in the
late 1960's were, for example, similar in format and substance to hard min-
eral agreements negotiated elsewhere in the 1940's and 1950's.
There is much to be said for the traditional form of concession. The
agreements are often less complicated and may therefore be easier to
administer than some of the newer forms of agreements. The income
tax provisions, if well conceived and well drafted, can be relatively straight-
forward. A country with a weak income tax administration or without
a sophisticated governmental body to police an agreement might well pre-
fer a traditional agreement, which raises minimal administrative problems,
to one which is so complex that the governmental machinery simply can-
not cope with its administration. Government income might well be
higher when complex, though purportedly more favorable, financial ar-
rangements are avoided. 2
Nevertheless, many developing countries have been under pressure to
break away from the traditional form of agreement. The pressure has
usually been: (1) for increased government participation in the owner-
ship of the enterprise; and (2) for an increased governmental role in the
management of the extractive operation. The result has been agreements
that differ significantly in structure from the traditional concession ar-
rangements. In most cases, they have been more complex.
THE MODERN CoNCESsIoN
Equity Sharing
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a rapid increase in the
number of agreements that provided for some local participation in the
ownership of the firm that extracts raw materials. Major participation has
usually meant ownership of shares by the host government. The most
publicized cases of participation were in petroleum. In the major oil-
producing nations, negotiations in the early 1970's led to agreements under
which government participation in a number of operating companies was
32 See Wedderspoon, Simplifying Taxes in East Africa, 6 FiNANcE AN DEVELOPMNT
51 (1969).
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scheduled to reach 51 percent by 1983. This timetable has already been
accelerated in a number of countries. Although public awareness of par-
ticipation was created by oil in the 1970's, the trend had started earlier
and was not limited to petroleum.
Equity sharing, or "participation," may or may not bring the govern-
ment an effective voice in management decisions within the operating
company and may or may not mean that the government plays an active
role in other activities leading to the ultimate disposal of the resource.
The concept of participation as it has been developed in the oil industry
has been characterized as "pseudoparticipation," since it does not assume
that the host country produces or sells the oil, or transfers it downstream
for refining and sale. Rather, participation has been criticized by one ob-
server simply as "an ingenious way of further increasing the tax per barrel
without touching either posted prices or nominal tax rates."83 But owner-
ship itself has political appeal to governments, even when actual participa-
tion in management may be minimal. Many mechanisms have been de-
vised to bring about the political benefits of joint ownership.
One form of equity-sharing agreement is that in which the government
obtains equity interest without a financial contribution, but in exchange
for all or part of its right to levy an income tax. The economic advantages
to the host country of such an arrangement are not always self-evident.
Some government negotiators have believed that an exchange of the right
to impose, say, a 50 percent income tax for 50 percent of the equity is an
even exchange. It often is not. In general, holding 50 percent of the
equity is, in purely financial terms, less attractive to the government than
is an income tax at a 50 percent rate. Under the ownership arrangement,
the government receives half the dividend payments. But half the divi-
dend payments is usually less than half of the taxable profits of an enter-
prise. Dividends come out of the funds that remain after the repayment
of principal on debt and after the provision of funds out of profits for
reinvestment in the on-going operation. Under a normal equity-sharing
arrangement, the government shares in capital expenditures; under a tax
arrangement, the government takes its funds before the deduction of such
expenditures. In rare cases, however, net cash flow from which dividends
are paid may be greater than taxable profits.
As an illustration of the problem, consider the Liberian American Com-
pany (LAMCO) agreement of 1960. As a co-owner of the Swedish interest
in the LAMCO-Bethlehem Steel joint venture, the government was to re-
ceive, as dividend payments, half of the annual dividends accruing from
the Swedish interest.34 The dividends were to be in lieu of royalties and
income tax. Because of the low ratio of equity to loan capital, a substantial
33Adelman, Is the Oil Shortage Real?, 9 FOR. POL. 69, 84 (Winter 1972-73).
3 Joint Venture Agreement between the Liberian American Mining Co. and Bethle-
hem Steel (April 28, 1960). Chapter LXV of Acts Passed by the Legislature of the
Republic of Liberia During the Session 1959-1960. For a detailed discussion of the
financial structure of the Lkco Joint Venture, see R. W. CLow:a, et al., GRowTu
WrmouT DEvELoPmEbrr: AN EcoNoMIc SURVEY OF LimUA 210 If. (1966).
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amount of the funds generated (estimated to be about $15 million a year
for the first ten years of production)35 was to go to the repayment of debt
and interest. 36 While under a normal taxing arrangement the govern-
ment would receive, through taxes, a portion of the profits calculated before
the repayment of debt, under the equity-sharing arrangement the govern-
ment shared in "profits" calculated after repayment of debt was deducted.
Although there could have been a higher rate of participation that would
have been equivalent, over time, to the surrendered taxes, the equity-sharing
arrangement at 50/50 did not benefit the government to the extent that
taxes at 50 percent would have.
Actually, the LAMCO arrangements were even less favorable to the
government than has been suggested. Two other factors affected the
"profits" in which the government was to share: the Export-Import Bank,
as a condition of its loan, required that $25 million in profits be set aside
by 1970 in a special reserve; and there were to be deductions from gross
profit for "equipment replacement" (at a rate of about $0.30 per ton)
in addition to what was to be allowed for depreciation. These items were
to be deducted from the company "profits" in which the government was
to share. Under the usual taxing arrangement, these items would not have
been deductible in the calculation of net taxable income. The result was
that the Liberian Government paid for a substantial part of the company's
capital facilities out of "forgone" dividends.
Reinvestment of profits by the mining enterprise may, of course, mean
larger payments out of earnings sometime in the future. But if reinvest-
ment promises adequate returns, the foreign company would probably
provide all of the funds, in the absence of government participation, leav-
ing the government with its increased future revenues from taxes in any
case.
The exchange of some rights to tax for equity may, of course, make
political and economic sense. In fact, that exchange is explicit in many
of the equity-sharing agreements, even where some income tax remains.
Much more unusual is the case where the government has paid for its
share of equity at the price paid by other stockholders and, at the same
time, has given up its right to tax profits. The Liberian-National Iron Ore
Co. Agreement of 1958 may be a unique example. 7  The financial con-
35 CLowER, supra note 34, at 219.
86 Analysis suggests that much of the loan capital might better have been character-
ized as equity rather than debt. In such a case "interest" payments would be treated
as "dividend" payments and would not be deductible from gross income for tax pur-
poses. This problem is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of our forthcoming book.
37 Concession Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and the
National Iron Ore Company, Ltd. (March 13, 1958). Art. 7 reads:
Since the Government presently owns, or has the right to acquire, one-hall of the
shares of the Concessionaire to be issued, the Government forever waives all
royalty.... In lieu of all other Liberian taxes ... the Concessionaire shall pay
an exploitation tax and a surface tax.
In commenting on the NIOC arrangement, an economic survey team has observed
that "the government's equity participation in the National Iron Ore Company is ex-
tremely costly. It has invested $5 million as a stockholder, just half of the total equity
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sequences of this agreement were so disadvantageous to the government
that the most charitable interpretation must be that the issue was not
clearly understood by the government negotiators.
A common pattern in more recent equity-sharing agreements has been
for the government to "buy" shares of equity and to retain all its rights
to tax corporate profits. In the vast majority of cases, the government
contribution has been made only after the existence of a commercially
viable source has been proved, that is, after a significant portion of the
uncertainty has been eliminated. Two agreements, (1) the 1970 nickel
contract between the Government of Colombia and Chevron Petroleum
Company and the Hanna Mining Company and (2) the 1967 Bougainville
Copper Agreement provide examples of this type of arrangement.38  The
Colombian Government, through its wholly owned Instituto de Fomento
Industrial (IFI), entered into a joint venture with the Hanna Mining
Company. The government retained the right to tax both the joint venture
and any profits accruing to Hanna Mining from its Colombian operations.
Similarly, Papua New Guinea bought equity in the Bougainville mine while
imposing a gradually rising rate of income tax.
To share in ownership, the host government may obtain an interest
in a contractual joint venture, rather than holding shares in an incorporated
entity. In 1965, the National Iranian Oil Company, for example, pro-
vided 50 percent of the capital in a partnership for offshore oil, with the
other half invested by a consortium of foreign firms. In this arrangement,
the government retained its right to tax.
When a shift is made in a particular project from a traditional arrange-
ment to one that provides for sharing of ownership, the steps may be
complex and confusing. An illustration is the Chilean Government's pur-
chase in 1969 of shares in Kennecott's subsidiary. In the change, the
government acquired 51 percent of the shares in the copper mining opera-
tion, but the taxing arrangements were revised considerably at the same
time. In fact, the result of the combined changes appeared to be that the
burden on the company of taxation and dividends paid to the government
remained approximately the same after the new arrangement as before.31
The Zambian Government's takeover of 51 percent of the shares in its
copper operations in 1969 had much in common with the Chilean change.
Shares were purchased on the basis of book value and paid for with 5
percent government bonds. At the same time, there was a major re-
capital. As a 50 percent stockholder, it will get 50 percent of net (distributed) profits,
the other shareholders paying zero income taxes on their 50 percent of net profits."
CLOWER note 34 supra.
38 Agreement between Instituto de Fomento Industrial and Compafiia de Niquel
Colombiano, S.A. (July, 1970). See Colombia Mine Accord Regarded as Pace-Setter,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1970, at 31. The Bougainville Agreement was ratified in 1967.
See Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement)
(Ordinance 1967). The Agreement was amended in 1974 (See Mining (Bougainville
Copper Agreement) (Amendment) Bill 1974.)
39 Private interviews.
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vision of the tax arrangement, thought by some observers to favor the
foreign companies. 40
There are a number of technical problems that should be dealt with
in the negotiation of equity-sharing arrangements. Two important ones
relate to the rights of one partner to purchase shares offered by another
and the method by which any expansion of the project will be financed.
In Zambia, the copper agreements assured the government of rights to
acquire shares that a minority shareholder wished to sell. In that agree-
ment, funds for expansion were to be provided pro rata by all equity
holders.
There are many variations on the equity-sharing theme. An interesting
arrangement between the Libyan National Oil Company and Shell Ex-
ploration (Libya) Ltd. combined some of the features of ownership shar-
ing with those of production sharing. That agreement provided for a
changing division of interest in the project. The national company's share
began at 25 percent and remained at that level until production reached
260,000 barrels per day; it was to increase to 50 percent when output
reached 500,000 barrels per day. Exploration expenses were to be borne
by Shell, which also advanced the state company's share of capital for
development and funds needed for operating expenses. The state com-
pany was to reimburse Shell for these advances out of the state company's
share of production.41
Arrangements that allow workers rights of participation could also be
considered as variations of equity sharing. The Peruvian General Mining
Law of 1971 provided that mining companies were to deduct, free of
taxes, ten percent of their net income, four percent as "liquid participa-
tion" for Peruvian workers, and six percent for "property participation"
by Peruvian workers.42 The four percent was to go to a workers' coopera-
tive and the six percent was to be invested as shares in the company held
by the workers. Once the workers had shares they would be guaranteed
one representative on the Board of Directors. Workers' representation on
the board thereafter was to be in proportion to equity ownership.
Still rare in the mid-1970's was direct equity sharing between govern-
ments, although state companies from developed countries had fairly fre-
quently participated in the exploitation of a developing country's minerals.
In early 1973 Guinea had under consideration the creation of two mixed
companies to develop the iron ore deposits of Mount Nimba and Mount
Simandou near the Liberian frontier. The two companies were to include
capital from Guinea, Liberia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Zaire as well as from
companies from Japan, Yugoslavia, and Spain. One motivating factor for
including Liberia was to link the Guinea operation to the 250 kin. railway
40 Harvey, Tax Reform in the Mining Industry, in M. BosTocx AND C. HAmIEY
(eds.), ECONOW11C INDEPENDENCE AND ZAMBIAN COPPER: A CASE STrvy OF FonnioN
INvESrMENT 131 (1972).
41OECD, On.: TBE PRESENT SrruATioN AND FuTURE PROSPECTS 91 (1973).
42 Peru, General Mining Law, Art. 281ff, note 10 supra.
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which ran from the LAMCO iron ore operation on the Liberian side of
Mt. Nimba to a Liberian port.43 Nigeria decided in 1974 to take a five
percent interest in two iron ore companies in Guinea with an apparent
view to establishing a Nigerian iron and steel industry, which would stimu-
late demand for coking coal which Nigeria has in some abundance.
44
While a general trend toward some variant of increased government
participation in the equity of mining enterprises was evident in the early
1970's, some countries have had second thoughts as they approached the
issue, especially as the risks became apparent. The Government of Sierra
Leone had, in 1969, stated its intentions of taking a 51 percent share in
four major mining companies operating in the country. Interest in equity
participation was apparently inspired by events in Zambia where the gov-
ernment had taken shares in copper operations. In 1973, however, the
Sierra Leone Government, claiming that it did not have sufficient liquid
assets, gave up plans to take an equity interest in one of the companies,
Sierra Leone Development Company. The prospects for high profits were
dim. Although the company was apparently willing to sell shares below
book value, the equity participation plan was replaced with an agreement
providing for higher taxes and for government representation on the board
of directors.,"
The success of governments in Latin America and Central Africa in
obtaining equity in copper operations influenced still other countries. In
1972, the Government of Papua New Guinea passed a resolution in its
House of Assembly announcing its goal of substantial equity participation
in mining operations in the country. However, when it was faced with
a renegotiation of the Bougainville arrangements in 1974, the government
decided not to push for greater equity participation. Torn between the ap-
parently conflicting advice of the plethora of advisors that the government
called upon, it simply delayed action for months as the various govern-
ment factions made their views known. In the end, it ignored the calls for
more ownership than it already had and simply increased the taxes.
In spite of the problems associated with equity participation, it will
almost certainly continue to grow in importance. In countries where taxes
are fixed by the general laws, shared ownership provides a way of re-
arranging the financial benefits on an ad hoc basis to reflect bargaining
powers. And mere ownership is often considered an attractive goal.
Management control
Governments often acquire equity for other than purely financial reasons,
or for the satisfaction that ownership itself provides. It is often assumed
that more ownership gives more control. Increased control over the opera-
tions of the foreign firm, either real or imaginary, promises political bene-
43 Sekou Tour6's Iron Mountains, WEsr AFYRA, Feb. 19, 1973, at 239. But see Big
Bauxite Mine Begins, id., March 26, 1973, at 421.
44Interest in Nigerian Coal Grows, id., May 6, 1974, at 535.
-t Opting Out of Iron Ore, id., March 5, 1973, at 303, April 30, 1973, at 577.
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fits in addition to the possible financial ones. 46 The extent of the govern-
ment's share of control may be in proportion to its share of equity owner-
ship. However, in many instances, as we have indicated, it is not.
One device for dissociating equity ownership from control is the as-
signment of different classes of shares to the different parties. One class
of shares may have no voting rights. In some cases, holders of a particular
class of shares may be empowered to appoint a certain number of mem-
bers of the board of directors and those of another class may be entitled
to another number, regardless of the claims on the assets of the enterprise
represented by the shares. The 1960 LAMCO agreement in Liberia is
one example of this kind of arrangement. Although each shareholder had
50 percent of the equity, the holder of Class A shares, the Government of
Liberia, could appoint only five members of the board of directors. The
holders of Class B shares could appoint six.
The arrangements for control do not, of course, always favor the foreign
firm. In a given situation a government may have sufficient bargaining
power to insist on a voice in management beyond that represented by
its stockholdings. In some cases, a government's class of shares may carry
certain rights, but more commonly the agreement itself simply specifies
the right of the government to name a certain portion, say 50 percent,
of the directors on the operation's board. Moreover, it has not been un-
common in modern concessions for the government to have a veto right
over certain kinds of decisions, regardless of the size of its shareholdings.
A common mechanism for granting the veto has been a requirement that
a unanimous vote of the board of directors be obtained before certain
steps can be taken by the management. The presence of at least one
government-appointed director can enable the government to block a
decision.
Most host governments have chosen not to become involved in the day-
to-day operations of the firm. To make sure that decisions of importance
reach the board, however, some governments have insisted that a general
operating plan be submitted by the line management for the approval of
the board. The agreement spells out the contents of the operating plan:
usually production volumes, major investments, sales plans, operating
budgets, and employment plans. The line management is required to
operate within this plan or to seek approval from the board for any de-
partures. In such cases, the government and the company are usually
pleased to keep the government out of day-to-day operations, while assur-
ing the government the right to review important decisions.
Perhaps the two central problems faced by a government in structuring
its representation on a board of directors of an extractive operation have
40 It has been suggested that despite the management control provisions in its pro-
duction-sharing oil agreements, Indonesia's highly touted state oil company, Pertamina,
actually exercises little real management control over foreign operations. ROBEnT
FABBnm:N, O-. DiscovERY mm TE maCAL C ANGE n SouTnrAST ASIA-LEGAL
ASPECTS OF PRODUCTION SHARiNG CoNTRnAcrs IN THE INDNEsIAN PErmoium INDUsTnY
at 21 ff. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973. Field Report Ser.
No. 3.)
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been: (1) defining those issues in which it is vitally concerned and (2)
assuring that its representatives on the board have the necessary technical
data to make intelligent decisions on matters before the board. The Co-
lombian nickel agreement with Chevron and Hanna Mining Company,
mentioned above, illustrates one approach to the solution of these prob-
lems. During the negotiations with the foreign company, the Colombian
Government made a careful appraisal to determine which decision areas
were of special concern to the government in its role as a minority partner
in the venture and as a sovereign power. It determined that in many
areas the interests of the foreign firm and the government would probably
coincide. Each party would be interested, for example, in purchasing
goods, services, technical assistance, and "kmow-how" at minimum prices,
so long as the suppliers were not parties affiliated to the foreign investor.
The Colombian Government would have little need for veto power over
such matters. On the other hand, the government was able to define cer-
tain classes of decisions in which the interests of the majority and minority
parties to the joint venture might diverge or in which national interests
might differ from those of the enterprise. These classes of decisions
included:
(1) the purchase or sale of goods, services, technical assistance, or
"know-how" from or to a partner or an affiliate of the major shareholder;
(2) the appointment of a management group and the terms of a man-
agement contract;
(3) the approval of the annual exploration, development, investment,
production, and budget plans to govern operations under the management
contract;
(4) the approval of purchases by the operator that represent expendi-
tures over certain amounts;
(5) the geographical location of facilities;
(6) the appointment of an auditor for the books of the joint venture
and the approval of financial statements;
(7) the contents of any annual reports of the joint venture operations;
(8) the mortgaging of any assets of the joint venture;
(9) the purchase or sale of goods, services, etc., to or from nations un-
friendly to Colombia; and
(10) the use of technology harmful to the environment.
For decisions of these types, government consent was required.
After spelling out the areas of concern, the government negotiators were
worried that their representatives would not be sufficiently well informed
to make intelligent decisions in all these matters. To help overcome the
difficulties, the government made provision in the agreement for the crea-
tion of a technical committee, composed primarily of Colombians, the
main task of which would be to assure: (a) that adequate training of
Colombians would take place, (b) that the government would be apprised
of any past or future decisions by the operator which would affect its in-
terests, and (c) that technical information and analysis would be provided
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to the government representatives on the board of directors so that they
would have an adequate basis for participation on the board.
This approach has its parallel in the United States, where the idea of
providing and financing an autonomous staff of technical specialists to
assist "outside" directors in making decisions has been put forward. The
proposal has come as a response to the increasing recognition that outside
board members have rarely been equipped to make complex management
decisions or to exercise effective control over day-to-day managment.47
A technical committee promises possible help.
In the Colombian case, the government was the holder of a minority
interest. Under the increasingly common arrangements whereby the host
government owns the majority of shares, the problems can be reversed.
The task is then to provide protection for the foreign company as the
minority stockholder.
In Zambia, where the government held 51 percent of the shares in a
particular copper concession, theprivate interests were granted the right
to veto expansion plans or appropriations for capital, exploration, or pros-
pecting expenditures. An agreement in Sierra Leone provides another
example of minority interests in the hands of the foreign firm. Under a
renegotiated agreement with the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, Ltd.,48 a
new company was formed with the capital held 51 percent by the govern-
ment and 49 percent by SLST. The board of the new company was to
consist of eleven directors of whom six (including the chairman) would be
appointed by the government. All the operating assets of the old com-
pany were to be acquired by the new joint company which would carry
on the diamond mining. The government agreed to pay for its proportion
of the fixed assets of the business by issuing negotiable bonds and to pay
for its share of the net current assets in cash. The joint company was to
be taxed on its profits at a rate of 70 percent. The foreign firm was to
appoint the first managers to carry on the day-to-day operations of the
company.
The agreement had provisions for the protection of the foreign firm, as
minority shareholder, as well as guarantees for the government. For the
security of the private firm, an affirmative vote of three-fourths of all the
directors was required for:
(1) the termination of the operations of the joint company or the sale
or transfer of the assets or rights of the joint company;
(2) the issue of additional shares, the borrowing of funds, the creation
of charges, the making of loans, or the giving of guarantees;
(3) the appointment or removal of the auditors of the joint company;
4rArthur J. Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, §3,
at 1. See also Levy, How an Audit Committee Can Help, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1972,
§3, at 16; Townsend, Let's Install Public Directors, Busnwss AND Soc. Rrv., at 69-70
(1972).
48 For a full statement of the terms of the new agreement, see Consolidated African
Selection Trust Ltd., Report to Members on Agreement with the Government of Sierra
Leone, Sept. 11, 1970.
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(4) any purchase or sale of any product or assets or any other trans-
action carried out otherwise than on the best commercial terms reasonably
available or in the normal commercial activities of the joint company;
(5) any restriction on the effective implementation of agreements with
the government;
(6) the expenditure by the joint company of any funds or the making
of any commitments in respect of any new mining operation or facility or
the making of any expenditure, considered by at least three directors to
be outside the ordinary course of business; and
(7) the appointment of any committee, board, or attorney whose powers
included the doing of certain acts.
Many government officials think that equity-sharing arrangements, such
as in the Colombian and Sierra Leone cases, can help in reducing some of
the political problems associated with foreign activities in the minerals
field. The promise, and sometimes practice, of increased control in the
hands of the government at least provides politically useful evidence that
the government is concerned about national sovereignty. Participation in
management, where it actually occurs, may provide experience that hastens
the day when the host country is able to operate its mines without the
direct involvement of foreign firms.
Management Contracts
Under equity-sharing arrangements or in a situation where the foreign
company's shares have been nationalized, the government may want to
return the foreign firm to the day-to-day management of the operating
company's activities. The usual device for this is the management contract.
Zambia provides an example of the use of a management contract under
shared ownership. Part of the terms of the 1969 agreement between the
Government of Zambia and Roan Selection Trust (RST), under which the
government was to acquire 51 percent equity interest in RST's subsidiary
operating in Zambia, included provision for separate management and
consultancy contracts.49 RST was to provide: (1) technical services (in-
cluding preparing progress reports, long-term plan reports, capital expendi-
ture estimates, advice on operating problems); (2) general services (in-
cluding advice on the preparation of company reports and financial state-
ments and on the development and processing of minerals); and (3)
specialized services (including engineering consultancy services, staff,
recruitment).
Under the management contract RST was to be remunerated in the
amount of 0.75 percent of the state operating companys gross sales pro-
ceeds. In addition it would receive two percent of the operating company's
consolidated profits after certain deductions. RST would also receive
an engineering fee of three percent of specified construction costs of
49 These contracts are described in some detail in M. BosiocK AND C. HAnvEy, supra
note 40, at 229
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projects and a recruiting fee of 15 percent of the total emoluments payable
to expatriate employees during their first year.
Under a separate sales and marketing contract RST was to receive 0.75
percent of the gross sales proceeds of all sales of copper metal throughout
the world and 2.5 percent on cobalt sales.
Copper mining in the Congo illustrates the possibilities for using man-
agement contracts after a complete nationalization. In 1967 the Congo
(now Zaire) Government took over the Belgian-owned Union Mini~re
du Haut Katanga, without compensation. In 1969, however, the govern-
ment and the Belgian firm reached agreement on compensation and on an
arrangement under which the company would provide management as-
sistance on a fee basis.
No standard terms have developed for management contracts. In
some, remuneration has been based on sales volume and expenses incurred.
Others have turned to a share of profits, with a hope that the managing
firm would have an incentive to increase efficiency. Whatever the basis of
compensation, the interest of foreign firms in management contracts has
generally been limited, unless they have had some equity ownership or
another form of access to a significant portion of profits. In most cases
where management contracts have been successful, the foreign firm has
had a clear and strong interest in the success of the operation. Where
the firm's downstream operations depend on inputs from the project it is
managing, the conditions may be met."0 In any case, experience suggests
that the host government can face tough administrative problems even
with management contracts. For example, there have been numerous cases'
where the managing enterprise has siphoned profits out of the project
managed under contract through purchases from affiliates of materials at
prices far above those that would be available elsewhere.
PODUCrioN-SHARiNG, SERVCE, AND WoRK CoNTRACrs
Some agreements have gone beyond the modern concession format in
which the foreign firm holds equity in the facilities. Under some arrange-
ments, the government simply purchases the services of a foreign enterprise
which has no ownership interest in the producing company. Service con-
tracts, work contracts, and production-sharing arrangements provide ex-
amples of agreements that are sometimes close to this structure.
Some of the most confusing terminology surrounds these three "types"
of agreement. In the early 1970's such arrangements were still, as one
commentator observed earlier with regard to service contracts, "too new
and too few to have developed any very pronounced standardization in
name, form, or substance." 51
50 For a dischssion of management contracts, see P. GABn L, THE INTERNAMTONAL
TRANsFER OF CoRPoRATE SILs: MANAGExcENT CONTRACTs IN LEss DEVELOPED COUN-
T=Es (1967).
51 E. Murphy, Jr., Oil Operations in Latin America: The Scope for Private Invest-
ment, 2 INT. LA-,WE 455, 471 (1968).
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In theory, under all three arrangements the foreign firm is a "contractor,"
not a concession holder or partner. The investor is a "hired technician"
rather than the operator of a subsoil interest. In practice, the line between
the conventional concession contract on the one hand and a service, work,
or production-sharing contract on the other has been less than sharp. And
the boundaries dividing service contracts, work contracts, and production-
sharing agreements from each other have often been very blurred indeed.
Service and Work Contracts
Perhaps the most basic content of service and work contracts is illus-
trated by mineral agreements in Indonesia, negotiated between 1966 and
1973, for copper, nickel, and tin operations. Indonesia adopted the termi-
nology of "work contract" for these arrangements. The essential feature
of the contract has been that the title to the ore remained with the gov-
ernment until it was extracted. In other respects, however, the Indonesian
work contracts were quite similar to the traditional concession and quite
dissimilar to the "service contracts" of the Middle East. For example, the
Indonesian "contractor" simply paid a corporate income tax, although
sometimes at special rates, on his profits from the sale of the ore. 2 And
the ownership of the mining facilities was unambiguously vested in the
hands of the foreign firm.
Clearly, more has usually been implied in the terminology of service
and work contracts than was evident in the case of the Indonesian agree-
ments for hard minerals. Passing of title is usually, in practice, not much
more than a legal nicet." 3 In fact, if no more is meant, many of the
traditional concessions in Hispanic law countries would technically qualify,
since according to that legal tradition the title to ore bodies resides auto-
matically in the state, although many concession documents in those coun-
tries have carefully skirted the issue of title.
The use of the terms service or work contracts usually implies a rather
different relationship from that which is understood under typical con-
cession agreements. The foreign firm is considered to be working as a
contractor in some sense for the host government. The foreigner's services
may be paid for in cash or kind. His remuneration could be based on
an annual fixed fee, but he generally receives reimbursement for actual
costs plus a payment based on profits.
The 1966 agreement between the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
and the French state agency, Enterprise de R'cherches et d'Activites
Petrolieres (ERAP) and ERAP's subsidiary, Socie6t Frangaises de Petroles
d'ran (SOFIRAN), provides a typical model of what is usually under-
stood as a service or work contract. The agreement avoided words of
direct grant and described ERAP and SOFIRAN as "contractors." ERAP
agreed to provide the risk capital for the exploration and its subsidiary
See, for exampl', Contract of Work between Indonesia and Freeport Indonesia,
Inc. (April 7, 1967), Art. 5.
"5 But see note 8, supra.
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agreed to provide the technical "know-how and services and to serve as
a general contractor. The oil produced was to belong to NIOC, an essen-
tial point of the agreement, but sale to ERAP of a percentage of the oil
produced was guaranteed at an agreed price. ERAP also agreed to act
as a broker and to sell certain quantities of crude oil on behalf of NIOC
on the world market. Funds advanced by ERAP for exploration and
development were to be repaid after oil was produced in commercial
quantities.54
As in the ERAP case, most arrangements have called for the foreign
firm to bear the risk of exploration. Some agreements have treated de-
velopment expenditures as an interest bearing loan from the foreign firm
to the government which could be repaid in cash or kind. In other ar-
rangements, the company would bear these expenditures entirely on its
own account. The only commitment to the company would be that, as
contractor, it was guaranteed a certain amount of the production which
would have to cover costs and profits.
Arrangements in Bolivia were similar to the NIOC-ERAP agreement,
but the terminology was rather different. Under the 1972 Bolivian general
law relating to hydrocarbons, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(Y.P.F.B.), the Bolivian state oil enterprise, was authorized to enter into
"operation contracts." 55 Under these agreements, the contractor would
initially bear all the costs and risks of exploration and exploitation, but
would eventually be compensated for expenses incurred during the ex-
ploitation phase should oil be found. All hydrocarbons produced by the
operator were to be delivered to Y.P.F.B. Y.P.F.B. retained, at wellhead
prices, the volumes necessary for paying national and departmental taxes.
Part of the balance was retained by Y.P.F.B. and a portion was to be de-
livered to the contractor.
The 1972 Bolivian law made provision for "petroleum servicd contracts"
as well as "operation contracts." These "petroleum service contracts" were
of a very special nature: they could be entered into by either Y.P.F.B. or
an operation contractor to engage a third party to perform a specialized
task such as marketing, transport, or refining.
Venezuela also has negotiated agreements that are labelled "service
contracts," but with a rather different meaning from Bolivia's "petroleum
service contracts." A petroleum service contract for oil in South Lake
Maracaibo between Corporacion Venezuela de Petroleo and Shell provides
an example. Under this arrangement, the financing was to be provided
by Shell, the contractor. After a three-year period, a formula came into
operation which would require the contractor to surrender a part of the
contract area that is likely to have oil. In the operating period, the con-
tractor would retain 90 percent of the oil, with the remainder going to
54 Cattan, Present Trends in Middle Eastern Oil Concessions and Agreements, in
PraVATE INvESTORs ABROAD-PoBLEMS AND SOLUTONS IN iTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN
1969, at 140 if (Cameron ed. 1969); also OECD, On . . . , supra note 41, at 92 ff.
55 Bolivia: General Laws of Hydrocarbons, 69 MINERAL TRADE NoTm, Nov. 1972,
at 14 ff.
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the state corporation. Shell would pay to the government a royalty of
16J percent and an income tax of 60 percent, based on a kind of posted
price. The state firm would receive five percent of the royalty going to
the government and a portion of Shell's after-tax profit varying from zero
to 55 percent when the net profits were more than US $0.50 per barrel.5
As with equity sharing arrangements, the amount of supervision exer-
cised by the government, or a state enterprise, over a contractor has varied
from case to case. In many situations government control has been more
theoretical than actual. In other cases it has been very real. The prob-
lems facing the government that has granted a service contract are akin
to those faced by government directors on the board of directors of a ven-
ture in which the government shares equity ownership. Without assistance,
perhaps from a "technical committee" of the type attempted in the
Colombia-Hanna Chevron agreement mentioned above, government repre-
sentation may generate little influence over decisionmaking.
Actual agreements have differed with regard to the mechanism through
which the government is to participate in management. The 1972 Bolivian
general law relating to hydrocarbons provided, in the case of an "operation
contract," for a "control committee" composed of representatives of Y.P.F.B.
That committee was to approve all budgets, programs of work, and meth-
ods of operation, and perform audits, among other things. The Venezuelan
agreement with Shell provided for joint operating committees. In addi-
tion, the state firm had the possibility of exercising influence by taking
up an option to purchase 20 percent of the equity in the contracting firm.
Production-Sharing Agreements
Along with service contracts, production-sharing agreements have be-
come popular. The term "production-sharing" agreement could, perhaps,
be reserved for arrangements whereby the foreign firm and the govern-
ment share the output of the operation in predetermind proportions. In
practice, the term has been applied to almost any dnd of arrangement
whereby there is at least an option that the firm and the government re-
ceive their benefits in kind rather than in cash. The distinction between
service contracts and production-sharing contracts had become one of
small technicalities as they had evolved by 1975.
Perhaps the purest examples of production-sharing agreements were
the so-called "co-production" agreements that had been negotiated for
manufacturing by Western firms in the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe. Typically, the Western firm provided licenses, machinery, and
technical assistance. In payment, it agreed to accept a certain amount of
the product of the firm.
For raw materials in the developing countries, the agreements have
generally been more complex, partly as a result of the fact that the foreign
investor has contributed more than simply technical know-how and partly
because of the greater risk that is usually involved. A number of petro-
56 OECD, OiL ... , supra note 41, at 92.
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leum agreements negotiated in Indonesia illustrate "production-sharing"
arrangements for raw materials. These agreements are of two distinct
types: those reached under the Sukarno regime between 1960 and 1965,
and those that emerged in the early Suharto period.
In the years 1960-65, most foreign-owned enterprises in Indonesia were
taken over by the government. At the same time, however, the govern-
ment negotiated a number of "production-sharing" agreements, primarily
with the Japanese.5" Production-sharing was characterized "as the pre-
ferred form of foreign investment." r The basic theory behind these
agreements was that they called for "redeemable fixed interest loans" 10
by the foreign company to the government. The loan would be repaid
by the government within a stipulated time in the form of an agreed per-
centage of the product of the project. Under these arrangements, the
foreign investor was generally regarded as a creditor, rather than as a
partner or contractor, even though he was responsible for certain services.
Principal, interest, and remuneration for technical and marketing coopera-
tion were to be paid to the firm only with a percentage of the annual
product valued at world prices. The Indonesians negotiated such produc-
tion-sharing agreements for timber, oil, nickel, and a number of other
commodities.
The change of government in 1965 brought with it corresponding
changes in the form of production-sharing contracts. The new agreements
bore only superficial resemblance to the production-sharing agreements of
the 1960-65 period or to traditional concession contracts. These contracts
were negotiated only for petroleum exploration and development; the
government adopted different forms of contract for other minerals and for
timber.
By early 1971 some 36 foreign companies had negotiated the new style
agreements with Pertamina, the state oil company. These agreements
were entered into by small and medium-sized firms, as well as by such
large international enterprises as Shell, Compagnie Frangaise de Petroles,
Gulf, BP, and Mobil.60
Under these arrangements, the foreign companies were "contractors" to
Pertamina. Although the terms of the various oil contracts varied in some
particulars, the production-sharing contract between P.N. Pertambangan
Minjak Nasional (Pertamina) and Phillips Petroleum Company (1968)
may be considered typical of the genre. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, Pertamina was responsible for the "management of the operations."
Phillips was made responsible to Pertamina for the "execution of opera-
tions" and provided all financial and technical assistance required for the
57For a full discussion of the agreements negotiated during this period, see Gibson,
Production-Sharing, 2 BuLL. OF INhONEsIA ECONOMIC SrIms, Feb. 1966, at 52 ff.
(Part I) and June 1966, at 75 ff (Part II).
58 Id. pt. I, at 52. 5 Id. pt. I, at 52-54.
60 Hunter, Oil Developments, 7 BuLL. oF INwNEImsN ECONOmIC Srurnus, March
1971, at 98. For a thoughtful analysis of post-Sukarno production-sharing contracts,
see R. FA3mxANT, note 46 supra.
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operations. Phillips carried the risk of "operating" costs (which included
the costs of exploration and development) and was required to market
all of the crude oil produced, if Pertamina so required.
The two key elements of the agreement that distinguish it from the
simple "service contract" are that: (1) Phillips was entitled to recover, in
the form of oil, operating costs up to an amount equal to 40 percent per
calendar year of crude oil produced and (2) of the balance of oil, Per-
tamina took 65 percent and Phillips received 35 percent. While it was
provided that 'Phillips shall be subject to the income tax laws of the Re-
public of Indonesia and shall comply with the requirements of such laws,"
Pertamina undertook to pay such taxes on behalf of Phillips. Title to
Phillips' portion of oil (including the portion to be sold to recover operat-
ing costs) passed to Phillips at the point of export. Title to equipment
purchased (not leased) by Phillips was vested in Pertamina when the
equipment was landed in Indonesia.
Two important pricing provisions were included in the contract. All
sales to third parties were to be valued at net realized prices f.o.b. field
terminal received by Phillips unless Pertamina found a more favorable
market, in which case this market price was to be used. Sales to affiliates
were to be valued by using "the weighted average per unit net price f.o.b.
field terminal received by Phillips for sales to Third Parties during the
preceding three (3) calendar months." 11 Any commissions paid to affili-
ates in connection with sales to third parties were not to exceed the "cus-
tomary and prevailing rate."
The pricing provisions gave important protection to the government
against the firm's underpricing of oil sold to affiliates. In addition, the
fact that Pertamina had the option of taking its share in oil rather than
money provided further protection. If the government was not satisfied
with the price of sales to affiliates (or to nonaffiliates), it could take pay-
ment in crude ol and attempt to sell it to a higher bidder.
In a production-sharing arrangement such as the Pertamina-Phillips Petro-
leum agreement, the host government must be concerned not only with
sales to affiliates. The costs of operations, although limited to 40 percent,
must be calculated to determine the amount of oil that goes to each party.
The problem was somewhat greater than in the earlier agreements which
provided only for the repayment of a predetermined "debt." Slippage in
the amount of income accruing to the government could occur in the cal-
culation of these "operating costs" incurred by the company under post-1965
agreements. Such deductions must be given the quality of scrutiny that
would be given by a government tax office to deductions from gross income
in a traditional concession agreement.
Several production-sharing agreements negotiated in Indonesia after the
Phillips Petroleum contract added a new provision requiring the contractor
to offer a stated percentage of his "contractual rights and obligations" to
G1 "Affiliate" is defined in Section I, subsect. 1.2.14. It is noteworthy that the earlier
(1966) Production-Sharing Contract between P.N. Pertambangan Minjak Nasional and
Kyushu Oil Co., Ltd. makes no reference to affiliates.
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an Indonesian participant as soon as commercial sales were made.62 De-
pending on the particular contract, the local participants could be either
individuals, corporations, or state entities. Typically, the portion required
to be offered to Indonesian participants was either five or ten percent.
It is not surprising that most of the production-sharing agreements have
been in the oil industry. For the arrangements to be of significant benefit
to the host country, the government must be able to sell domestically or
on foreign markets a share of the output of the extractive operation. This
has been possible for oil as was effectively demonstrated in 1973, as oil-
producing countries made the most of their "participation oil." For many
other minerals, sales of large quantities on spot markets can not be
arranged so smoothly.
The government must depend on the foreign firm to sell to affiliates and
to arrange -long-term sales contracts with other firms in the industry. In
fact, even oil agreements usually make some provision for the company
to take the government's share of the oil. At times, the cost to the com-
pany can be high. In August 1973, Occidental had to buy back Libya's
share at $4.90 per barrel, a price that appeared at the time to be high,
at 320 above the posted price.83 Soon thereafter, the price structure had
changed in such a way that most producing countries were selling on the
open market some of the participation oil that had previously been sold
through the companies' marketing channels.
There have been signs that the changes in structure of other minerals
industries may increase the attractiveness of production-sharing in those
industries. The nationalizations of copper operations in the late 1960's
and early 1970's have shown that host countries can sell their own copper.0 '
With more open markets the production-sharing model may have some-
thing to offer governments. For example, the 1970 OMRD Ecuadorian
copper agreement called for the government to take its royalty payments
in the form of ore, if it so chose.65 Some other industries show similar
possibilities. A 1974 agreement between Niger, Continental Oil Co. and
CEA, the French Atomic Energy Commission, gives the government the
right to market its share of uranium produced.8
62 See the Arco contract of August 9, 1971 and the Indonesian Offshore contract of
March 3, 1972, for example. Both are reproduced in B. FAnBamw , OIL Dxscov n
Am TECmCAL CENGE 3w SoumAn AsrA-TH. INDONESIAN PETnOLEm INDusTny:
MISCELMANEOUS SOURCE MATErIAL (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1973. Field Report Ser. No. 4).
63 Smith, Libya Intensifies Oil Restrictions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1973, at 43.
64See R. Vernon, Sovmmnacxr, AT BAY: Tm MuLTmATioNAL SPnEAD or U.S.
ENTERPISE 41-43 (1971). The ability of Chile to sell copper was, of course, subject
to attempts by the companies whose properties were nationalized to block sales of
Chilean copper shipments through court action.
65 In mid-1973 Ecuador signed a new agreement with Texas-Gulf Consortium pro-
viding for the right of Ecuador to purchase up to 51% of the company's total produc-
tion for its own merchanidising. See New Oil Contract Signed by Ecuador and Con-
sortium, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1973, at 47.
68 Uranium-Niger, 71 MnmqanA TRADE NoTEs, May 1974, at 12.
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Tim FUTURE OF =HE NEW STmucTupm
The 1960's brought major innovations in the forms of mineral agree-
ments. Most important, the new structures have broken the tight link
between ownership, control, and financial risks and benefits that was in-
herent in the traditional concession. Arrangements have been negotiated
which have repackaged these elements in ways that were not feasible
under the old structures.
Because ownership and control have become important political symbols
in most developing countries, new contractual forms have been created to
allow greater freedom in allocating ownership, control, and financial risks
and benefits in ways that satisfy both the new political and economic im-
peratives. Where a foreign firm is considered important for its financial,
technological, or marketing contributions, the new structures permit the
negotiation of agreements that allocate control and financial benefits in
ways that reflect the bargaining powers of the parties. Ownership can be
allocated in a way that makes the presence of the foreign firm politically
acceptable in the host country.67
In some cases, ownership has had symbolic or real meaning for the
foreign firm as well as for the host government. In many cases, extractive
firms have resisted arrangements that would leave them with less nominal
ownership than that to which they have become accustomed, even though
the financial and control aspects of the proposed agreements might be per-
fectly satisfactory. In some cases, the problems facing the private man-
agers considering innovative arrangements have been real. They have
worried about how to explain the new structures to shareholders, how to
set up insurance against expropriation and other risks on assets which
they do not own, or how to raise loans on property to which they do not
have title. In many cases, however, resistance from management seems to
have been based less on economic and legal grounds than on the symbolic
meaning of ownership.
Increasingly, managers have recognized that financial benefits-their
principal objective-need not be completely linked with control. And
control need not be linked at all with ownership.
The new forms of agreement will almost certainly spread to a number
of industries where they have not been common. In some cases, the new
arrangements will not generate significant shifts in the allocation of finan-
67 For a strong argument in favor of wide use of service and management contracts,
see T. H. MoRAx, TBE Im ,Ar OF U.S. DmECr INVESTMNT ox LATN-AzW.ICAX
RrATiONS (prepared for the Commission on U.S.-Latin-American Relations, Wash-
ington, June 1974). An interesting study of minerals investment in Australia found a
strong relationship between the benefits to Australia and the bargaining variables dis-
cussed in the first Chapter of our forthcoming book. However, ownership appeared to
be unrelated to the determinants of bargaining power. Apparently, Australia had not
attached great significance to equity holdings, but had concentrated on the economic
returns. See R. McKern, Multinational Enterprise and Natural Resources: A Study of
Foreign Direct Investment in the Australian Minerals Industry, Feb. 1972 (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Business School).
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cial benefits. But in industries in which bargaining powers continue to
shift in favor of the host country and where host country negotiating skills
are sufficient, the changes will be more than political. There will be real
changes in who controls the operations and who receives the financial
benefits from the projects.
Yet, while the new forms of agreement have provided ways of sharing
symbolic power and economic benefits in ways that the traditional con-
cession could not, they have not eliminated the complex technical problems
relating to the allocation of financial benefits and financial risks. The
technical issues remain no matter what the structure of the agreement.
It appears that many of the innovations for minerals typically governed
by traditional arrangements come from firms which have had experience
in other industries. Petroleum firms, in their efforts to diversify, are ex-
pressing a willingness to transfer the structures of petroleum agreements
to hard mineral operations such as copper. They have learned that some
of the ways of repackaging ownership, control, and financial issues are
feasible and acceptable to management. The concept of "ownership" has
lost some of its significance for managers of companies that have had ex-
perience with arrangements in which the company has had sufficient control
over critical decisions and has received attractive financial benefits with
little direct claim to ownership.
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